Summary of an article published on The Web Scraping Club on 2026-07-09 (free to read). Read the full article
On July 2nd the FBI and industry partners seized hundreds of domains tied to NetNut, a residential proxy provider run by NASDAQ-listed Alarum Technologies. Security researchers had linked its residential network to the Popa botnet, which ran on smart TVs and streaming boxes. If you buy proxies, this matters beyond the headline. Switching endpoint is easy. The harder part is the legal and compliance exposure, especially if your clients are in regulated industries like finance.
I walk through the timeline from the June 19th reports to the takedown, and how Google, the FBI and others went after a decentralized network without touching the devices themselves. I separate the parts of NetNut’s business: ISP proxies sourced through DiviNetworks and the residential pool behind Popa. I connect the case to the IPIDEA disruption in January. Then I look at what it means for customers, using the due diligence questionnaires that alternative data buyers send to vendors, and I close with how I now evaluate proxy providers.
What’s inside
- Three layers of the takedown: command and control, the SDK enrollment pipeline, and the commercial storefront.
- How Alarum has responded to the accusations, and what happened to its stock.
- Why many residential brands may be resellers of the same underlying pool, and why KYC at reseller level matters.
- What the FISD Alternative Data Council DDQ asks vendors about proxies, and why a seized provider is a problem in a sales process.
In the full article: The detailed timeline, the explanation of the ISP sourcing model, the Spur and Google figures, the DDQ questions, and my list of questions to put to a proxy provider are only in the full article.